PhilGoetz comments on indexical uncertainty and the Axiom of Independence - Less Wrong

9 Post author: Wei_Dai 07 June 2009 09:18AM

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Comment author: PhilGoetz 08 August 2009 06:38:49PM 1 point [-]

You compute a probability of being at each location, and then maximize expected utility. I tried to point out in this post that because decisions made at each location can interact non-linearly, this doesn't work.

How does it not work?

If you are at a different location, that's a different world state. You compute the utility for each world state separately. Problem solved.

And to the folks who keep voting me down when I point out basically the same solution: State why you disagree. You've already taken 3 karma for me. Don't just keep taking karma for the same thing over and over without explaining why.

Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 08 August 2009 06:54:40PM 0 points [-]

If you are at a different location, that's a different world state.

If the same world contains two copies of you, you can be either copy within the same world.

Comment author: PhilGoetz 08 August 2009 07:14:44PM 1 point [-]

The same world does not contain two copies of you. You are confused about the meaning of "you".

Treat each of these two entities just the same way you treat every other agent in the world. If they are truly identical, it doesn't matter which one is "you".