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Vladimir_Nesov comments on Expected futility for humans - Less Wrong
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You are looking at application of decision theory in this context from a wrong angle. You see a decision procedure as constructed bottom up, a complete toy model, that can't possibly match the challenge of the real thing. Instead, decision procedure here is a restriction, a principle that allows to catch inconsistencies in the messy human decision-making process.
If you believe that choosing Y requires X to be true, you don't believe X to be true, but you choose Y, something fishy is going on. You believe in the correctness of the rules, you observe that your stated opinions don't match the rules, and so you are forced to revise your opinions. The complexities of the physical world are not the issue, this is a device for the sanity of mind, and it can be applied at any level of granularity, with concepts however fuzzy and imprecise.
No, of course it's not for "running your life", that would be the approach of constructing a complete model (the right stance for FAI, the wrong one for human rationality). It's for mending errors in your mind that runs your life.
The special place of expected utility maximization comes from the conjecture that any restriction for coherence of thought can be restated in terms of expected utility maximization. My example can obviously be translated as well, by assigning utility to outcome given possible states of binary X and Y, and probability to X. This form won't be the most convenient, the original one may be better, but it's still equivalent, the structure of what's required of coherent opinion is no stronger.
As I said, it's just a special case, with utility maximization not being the best form for thinking about it (as you noted, simple logic suffices here). The conjecture is that everything in decision-making is a special case of utility maximization.