I guess I would follow up with these questions: (1) When you see someone else hurting, or attend a friend's funeral, do you feel sad; (2) are you more viscerally afraid of your own death than the strength of that emotion, if comparing two single cases; (3) do you decline to multiply out of a deliberate belief that all events after your own death ought to have zero utility to you, even if they feel sad when you think about them now; or (4) do you just generally want to leave the intuitive judgment (2) with its innate lack of multiplication undisturbed?

1: Yes. 2: Yes. 3: No. 4: I see a number of reasons not to do straight multiplication:

• Straight multiplication leads to an absurd degree of unconcern for oneself, given that the number of potential people is astronomical. It means, for example, that you can't watch a movie for enjoyment, unless that somehow increases your productivity for saving the world. (In the least convenient world, watching movies uses up time without increasing productivity.)
• No one has proposed a form of utilitarianism that is free from paradoxes (e.g., the Repugnant Conclusion).
• My current position resembles the "Proximity argument" from Revisiting torture vs. dust specks:

Proximity argument: don't ask me to value strangers equally to friends and relatives. If each additional person matters 1% less than the previous one, then even an infinite number of people getting dust specks in their eyes adds up to a finite and not especially large amount of suffering.

This agrees with my intuitive judgment and also seems to have relatively few philosophical problems, compared to valuing everyone equally without any kind of discounting.

I guess my most important question would be: Do you feel that way, or are you deciding that way?

My last bullet above already answered this, but I'll repeat for clarification: it's both.

PS again: Would you accept a 60% probability of death in exchange for healing the rest of reality?

This should be clear from my answers above as well, but yes.