I don't think it make sense to call the mere possibility of something "optimization power". In what sense is a possibility a "success" in the absence of a criterion for judging it so? Nor do I think it makes sense to assert that selection, a sequential process whose action increases (on average) a particular function, is not "do[ing] the optimizing". This is semantics, but fairly important semantics, I think.
You can't force cats to invent general relativity. Without human mind, it's impossible, while with human mind it's merely rare.
...it's probably adaptation executer.
We often assume agents are utility maximizers. We even call this "rationality". On the other hand in our recent experiment nobody managed to figure out even approximate shape of their utility function, and we know about large number of ways how agents deviate from utility maximization. How goes?
One explanation is fairly obvious. Nature contains plenty of selection processes - evolution and markets most obviously, but plenty of others like competition between Internet forums in attracting users, and between politicians trying to get elected. In such selection processes a certain property - fitness - behaves a lot like utility function. As a good approximation a traits that give agents higher expected fitness survives and proliferates. And as a result of that agents that survive such selection processes react to inputs quite reliably as if they were optimizing some utility function - fitness of the underlying selection process.
If that's the whole story, we can conclude a few things: