Ben calls those "implicit" and "explicit" goals here:
http://cosmistmanifesto.blogspot.com/2009/01/goals-explicit-and-implicit.html
Not great terminology - can we do better?
Another big one is: the goal(s) we want others to believe we have. Often "save the whales" - or some other piece of selfless signalling.
...it's probably adaptation executer.
We often assume agents are utility maximizers. We even call this "rationality". On the other hand in our recent experiment nobody managed to figure out even approximate shape of their utility function, and we know about large number of ways how agents deviate from utility maximization. How goes?
One explanation is fairly obvious. Nature contains plenty of selection processes - evolution and markets most obviously, but plenty of others like competition between Internet forums in attracting users, and between politicians trying to get elected. In such selection processes a certain property - fitness - behaves a lot like utility function. As a good approximation a traits that give agents higher expected fitness survives and proliferates. And as a result of that agents that survive such selection processes react to inputs quite reliably as if they were optimizing some utility function - fitness of the underlying selection process.
If that's the whole story, we can conclude a few things: