As far as I can see, that's just an acknowledgement that we can't know anything for certain -- so we can't be certain of any 'laws', and any claim of certainty is invalid.
I was arguing that any applied maths term has two types of meanings -- one 'internal to' the equations and an 'external' ontological one, concerning what it represents -- and that a precise 'internal' meaning does not imply a precise 'external' meaning, even though 'precision' is often only thought of in terms of the first type of meaning.
I don't see how that relates in any way to the question of absolute certainty. Is there some relationship I'm missing here?
The quote is getting at a distinction similar to yours. It's from the essay Geometry and Experience, published as one chapter in Sidelights on Relativity (pdf here).
A different quote from the same essay goes:
...On the other hand it is certain that mathematics generally, and particularly geometry, owes its existence to the need which was felt of learning something about the relations of real things to one another. The very word geometry, which, of course, means earth measuring, proves this. For earth-measuring has to do with
[edit: sorry, the formatting of links and italics in this is all screwy. I've tried editing both the rich-text and the HTML and either way it looks ok while i'm editing it but the formatted terms either come out with no surrounding spaces or two surrounding spaces]
In the latest Rationality Quotes thread, CronoDAS quoted Paul Graham: