Psychohistorian comments on Rationalists lose when others choose - Less Wrong
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The idea in general is interesting, but this argument itself is (still) rather incoherent. "Irrational" in this context does not seem to be different from "having an unusually high coefficient for the utility of the deciding entity," and if it does, I'm really curious as to what that is. If you give actual examples of what a real irrational person would be like, it would make this argument much more coherent. Basically, you seem to be baking part of a utility function into rational and irrational, which seems wholly inappropriate.
If your idea of rational v. irrational is that if Bob has to decide between hiring "Joe" and "Joe who really, really values Bob's utility a whole lot but is in no other respect different," then it seems like you don't have much of a point. Employers/lovers/decision makers will not be facing this dichotomy, and so it is of no real concern.
Also, employers care not about how much you value their goals, but how well you accomplish them, and rationality seems to be a relevant positive in this respect.
Oh, and I'm pretty sure I can want to help my spouse accomplish her goals without being a subroutine of my spouse. The whole subroutine argument seems convoluted and, well, unrelated to rationality.