According to the hypothesis that utility maximization is always a second order effect, it won't affect policy unless it can make the current government lose. So what's actually optimized here is not any kind of efficiency, but ability to deal with interest groups that can affect government's chances of winning with money and votes - I would say their power is mostly going to be detrimental to the results.
Also, as far as I can tell companies "threatening to move" or "moving" are almost entirely about tax avoidance, and active legislation to handle this (so that profits generated in the country stay taxed in the country) would pretty much get rid of the issue. Other than companies moving labour intensive production to countries with cheaper labour, which theoretically doesn't hurt the country at all.
According to the hypothesis that utility maximization is always a second order effect, it won't affect policy unless it can make the current government lose.
I absolutely think the movement of people and companies can make "the current government lose," often for better, sometimes for worse.
...Also, as far as I can tell companies "threatening to move" or "moving" are almost entirely about tax avoidance, and active legislation to handle this (so that profits generated in the country stay taxed in the country) would pretty muc
I have hypothesis that utility maximization is always a second order process - there's always some underlying selection process with its fitness, and only because it promotes traits that make agents agents act in a way that best approximates utility maximizing, adaptation executers seem to us like utility maximizers.
Now let's apply this to political systems:
There are also some hints how to design better representative democracy:
I used to think that direct democracy would be a major improvement relative to what we have now, but this analysis suggests that representative democracy (with small bits of direct democracy thrown in) should work much better.