And I will suggest in turn that you are guilty of the catchy fallacy name fallacy. The giant cheesecake fallacy was originally introduced as applying to those who anthropomorphize minds in general, often slipping from capability to motivation because a given motivation is common in humans.
I'm talking about a certain class of humans and not suggesting that they are actually motivated to bring about bad effects. Rather all it takes is for there to be problems where it is significantly easier to mess things up than to get it right.
I agree, this doesn't fall clearly under the original concept of giant cheesecake fallacy, but it points to a good non-specious generalization of that concept, for which I gave a self-contained explanation in my comment.
Aside from that, your reply addresses issues irrelevant to my critique of your assertion. It sounds like a soldier-argument.
Jamais Cascio writes in the atlantic:
Read the whole article here.
This relates to cognitive enhancement as existential risk mitigation, where Anders Sandberg wrote:
The main criticisms of this idea generated in the Less Wrong comments were:
These criticisms really boil down to the same thing: people love their cherished falsehoods! Of course, I cannot disagree with this statement. But it seems to me that smarter people have a lower tolerance for making utterly ridiculous claims in favour of their cherished falsehood, and will (to some extent) be protected from believing silly things that make them (individually) feel happier, but are highly unsupported by evidence. Case in point: religion. This study1 states that
Many people in the comments made the claim that making people more intelligent will, due to human self-deceiving tendencies, make people more deluded about the nature of the world. The data concerning religion detracts support from this hypothesis. There is also direct evidence to show that a whole list of human cognitive biases are more likely to be avoided by being more intelligent - though far from all (perhaps even far from most?) of them. This paper2 states:
Anders Sandberg also suggested the following piece of evidence3 in favour of the hypothesis that increased intelligence leads to more rational political decisions:
Thus the hypothesis that increasing peoples' intelligence will make them believe fewer falsehoods and will make them vote for more effective government has at least two pieces of empirical evidence on its side.
1. Average intelligence predicts atheism rates across 137 nations, Richard Lynn, John Harvey and Helmuth Nyborg, Intelligence Volume 37, Issue 1,
2. On the Relative Independence of Thinking Biases and Cognitive Ability, Keith E. Stanovich, Richard F. West, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2008, Vol. 94, No. 4, 672–695
3. Relevance of education and intelligence for the political development of nations: Democracy, rule of law and political liberty, Heiner Rindermann, Intelligence, Volume 36, Issue 4