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Roko comments on Nonparametric Ethics - Less Wrong
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If we talk about inferring the moral truth behind noisy moral intuitions, then if people's intuitions or models of those intuitions differ, the errors in their intuitions or models differ. One person can be more mistaken than another. If you reject moral realism you can recast this conversation in terms of commonly shared "moral" components of what we want.
I don't understand. How can you never be wrong about what is right, and still can be wrong about what is a shared component of what is right?
Okay. In a form, this view can even be equivalent, if you stick to the same data, a kind of nonparametric view that only recognizes observations. You see this discussion as about summarization of people's behavior (e.g. to implement a policy to which most people would agree), while I see it as about inference of people's hidden wishes behind visible behavior or stated wishes, and maybe as summarization of people's hidden wishes (e.g. to implement a policy that most people would appreciate as it unfolds, but which they won't necessarily agree on at the time).
Note that e.g. signaling can seriously distort the picture of wants seen in behavior.
The best summation of the topic I've yet come across.
Yes, you're very intelligent. Please expand.
I expect otherwise. There is a difference between who has got one's preference right, and whose preference is right. The former is meaningful, the latter is not. Two people may prefer different solutions, and both be right, or they may give the same solution and only one of them will be wrong, and they can both agree on who is right or who is wrong in each of these cases. There is no objective truth about what is "objectively preferable", but there is objective truth about what is preferable for a given person, and that person may have an incorrect belief about what that is.
What is preferable for a person here is a two-place word, while who is wrong is a one-place word about what is preferable.
(At least, approximately so, since you'd still need to interpret the two-place function of what is preferable for a given person yourself, adding your own preferences in the mix, but at least where the different people are concerned that influence is much less than the differences given by the person whose morality is being considered. Still, technically, it warrants the opposition to the idea of my-morality vs. your-morality.)
And then, there is the shared moral truth, on which most of the people's preferences agree, but not necessarily what most of the people agree on if you ask them. This is the way in which moral truth is seen through noisy observations.