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timtyler comments on The Domain of Your Utility Function - Less Wrong
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The arguments in the posts themselves seem unimpressive to me in this context. If there are strong arguments that human actions cannot, in principle, be modelled well by using a utility function, perhaps they should be made explicit.
Agreed. Now, if it were possible to write a complete utility function for some person, it would be pretty clear that "utility" did not equal happiness, or anything simple like that.
I tend to think that the best candidate in most organisms is "expected fitness". It's probably reasonable to expect fairly heavy correlations with reward systems in brains - if the organisms have brains.
Agents which can't be modelled by a utility-based framework are:
AFAIK, there's no good evidence that either kind of agent can actually exist. Counter-arguments are welcome, of course.