Vladimir_Nesov comments on Open Thread: July 2009 - Less Wrong

3 [deleted] 02 July 2009 04:00AM

You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.

Article Navigation

Comments (235)

Comments (235)

You are viewing a single comment's thread. Show more comments above.

Comment author: jwdink 07 July 2009 09:44:56PM *  1 point [-]

Haha if I just downvoted it, then I wouldn't be able to explain what I do mean.

I'm simply attempting to disagree with the logical necessity of reductionism. I said this earlier, I thought it was pretty clear:

My contention is that it's possible to reduce the levels, but not logically necessary-- and I support this contention with the fact that we don't necessarily collapse the levels in our reasoning, and we can't collapse the levels in our imagination.

So, the fact that a painting has a subject is a good example of this: I can't imagine the specific differences between a) the quark-configuration that would lead to me believing its "about a subject", versus b) the quark-configuration that would lead to me believing its just a blob. I can believe that quarks are ultimately responsible, but I'm not obligated to do so by a priori logical necessity.

So I'm not contending anything about what the most fundamental level is. I'm just saying that non-reductionism isn't inconceivable.

Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 08 July 2009 11:21:01AM 1 point [-]

I can believe that quarks are ultimately responsible, but I'm not obligated to do so by a priori logical necessity.

This is a slippery concept. With some tiny probability anything is possible, even that 2+2=3. When philosophers argue for what is logically possible and what isn't, they implicitly apply an anthropomorphic threshold. Think of that picture with almost-the-same atoms but completely different message.

The extent to which something is a priori impossible is also probabilistic. You say "impossible", but mean "overwhelmingly improbable". Of course it's technically possible that the territory will play a game of supernatural and support a fundamental object behaving according to a high-level concept in your mind. But this is improbable to an extent of being impossible, a priori, without need for further experiments to drive the certainty to absolute.

Comment author: jwdink 08 July 2009 02:55:29PM *  0 points [-]

Of course it's technically possible that the territory will play a game of supernatural and support a fundamental object behaving according to a high-level concept in your mind. But this is improbable to an extent of being impossible, a priori, without need for further experiments to drive the certainty to absolute.

Not quite sure what you're saying here. If you're saying:

1)"Entities in the map will not magically jump into the territory," Then I never disagreed with this. What I disagreed with is your labeling certain things as obviously in the map and others obviously in the territory. We can use whatever labels you like: I still don't know why irreducible entities in the territory are "incredibly improbable prior to any empirical evidence."

2)"The territory can't support irreducible entities," you still haven't asserted why this is "incredibly improbable prior to any empirical evidence."

Powered by Reddit Powered by Reddit