its certainly not a reductionist materialist theory
In what way would these "feelions" or "qualions" not be materials? Your answer to this question may reveal some interesting hidden assumptions.
It's a bit weird to me to call this a reductionist theory
Are you sure it's weird because it's not reductionist? Or because such a theory would never be seen outside of a metaphysical theory? So you automatically link the idea that minds are special because they have "qualions" with "metaphysical nonsense".
But what if qualions really existed, in a material way and there were physical laws describing how they were caught and accumulated by neural cells. There's absolutely no evidence for such a theory, so it's crazy, but its not logically impossible or inconsistent with reductionism, right?
what if qualions really existed, in a material way and there were physical laws describing how they were caught and accumulated by neural cells. There's absolutely no evidence for such a theory, so it's crazy, but its not logically impossible or inconsistent with reductionism, right?
Hmm... excellent point. Here I do think it begins to get fuzzy... what if these qualions fundamentally did stuff that we typically attribute to higher-level functions, such as making decisions? Could there be a "self" qualion? Could their behavior be indeterministi...
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