lavalamp comments on Open Thread: July 2009 - Less Wrong
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Inspired by Yvain's post on Dr. Ramachandran's model of two different reasoning models located in the two hemispheres, I am considering the hypothesis that in my normal everyday interactions, I am a walking, talking, right brain confabulating apologist. I do not update my model of how the world works unless I discover a logical inconsistency. Instead, I will find a way to fit all evidence into my preexisting model.
I'm a theist, and I've spent time on Less Wrong trying to be critical of this view without success. I've already ascertained that God's existence doesn't present a logical inconsistency. (An atheist thinks God's existence is illogical, but based on assumptions that are not necessary.) All empirical evidence I'll ever receive can be consistently incorporated into a God model. (Since, for example, I can question my perception or my sanity before questioning whether God exists.)
I'm an unusual theist, however, in that I have no emotional attachment to believing in God. The God that I believe in is already impersonal. Also, I've ascertained while on Less Wrong that atheism is also not logically inconsistent and, from what I can tell, is not a disadvantageous philosophical position. So how can I trigger a switch? Why is it not easy to flip from one position to another?
I hypothesize that there is something analogous to an activation energy required to update one's model so that there must be some motivation or impetus to update the model. For example, perhaps a new model explains things in a simpler way than the current model, and thus would be chosen for aesthetic reasons, or perhaps the new model would afford some practical benefit. (A difference in predictions that effects anything tangible would be an example of a practical benefit.)
(A) Choosing atheism because it is more aesthetic than theism.
I already prefer atheism to the extent that it is a simpler theory. (Some form of Occam's Razor.) However, it leaves a hole that God is shaped to fit, so, finally, I don't consider it to be more aesthetic.
This hole is the reason/cause/explanation for the existence and causal dependence/inter-connectedness of everything. As far as I am aware, the atheist model has no comment on this. However, apparently you don't experience any hole. Tell me, how does your model cover this hole? Perhaps if I could see that atheism is just as good as theism as a model, I could perform the switch, or at least hold them both as simultaneously equal hypotheses.
(B) Choosing atheism because it would provide some practical benefit.
In what way could becoming an atheist possibly improve my life for the better? Is there any actual, tangible benefit? Is there some cost that I'm not aware of that theism is exacting? As far as I know, there is no cost to being theist, because I recognize no extra guilt or obligation for my belief. Organized religion does provide some non-negligible burden to my everyday life, but that is independent of my belief. If I was an atheist, would anything in my life be easier or better?
I can't say I've ever met a theist who would recognize what you've outlined here and in your subsequent comments as a form of theism.
It seems to me that you've taken the language of theism and tweaked the definitions of all the words to be more reasonable. That's all well and good, but just because you use the same vocabulary as a theist doesn't mean you believe the same thing. It sounds to me like you're practically an atheist but you use religious words to describe your beliefs because they are comfortable.
This reminds me of the last time someone tried to convince me of complementarianism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Complementarianism). They were a reasonable person: so reasonable, in fact, that by the time they finished explaining complementarianism, it was nothing like complementarianism any more... In that case, my impression was that this person would have been placed in a very awkward position if they espoused a non-fundamentalist view. So they kept the fundamentalist terms and made them reasonable.
I'm probably in the same boat, or a similar one, FWIW.