The proximity effect, as described in the post, makes your "derandomizing" step invalid.
It can't be invalid: just replace the initial rule by this: of all 3^^^3, a random selection of 1000 will be made who are to be tortured. Given this rule, each individual has about 1 in 3^^^3/1000 probability of getting selected for torture, which is presumably even better deal than a certain speck. This is compared to choosing one person to torture with certainty. The proximity effect may say that those 1000 people are from far away and so of little importance, which I mentioned in the comment above. I don't think the choice of saving one known person over a thousand ridiculously-far-away people is necessarily incorrect though.
In line with my fine tradition of beating old horses, in this post I'll try to summarize some arguments that people proposed in the ancient puzzle of Torture vs. Dust Specks and add some of my own. Not intended as an endorsement of either side. (I do have a preferred side, but don't know exactly why.)
Oh what a tangle. I guess Eliezer is too altruistic to give up torture no matter what we throw at him; others will adopt excuses to choose specks; still others will stay gut-convinced but logically puzzled, like me. The right answer, or the right theory to guide you to the answer, no longer seems so inevitable and mathematically certain.
Edit: I submitted this post to LW by mistake, then deleted it which turned out to be the real mistake. Seeing the folks merrily discussing away in the comments long after the deletion, I tried to undelete the post somehow, but nothing worked. All right; let this be a sekrit area. A shame, really, because I just thought of a scenario that might have given even Eliezer cause for self-doubt: