Okay... I wasn't going to downvote the post because this is the sort of thing I thought was marvelously clever when I was thirteen (so there's hope) and you'd already been downvoted below posting threshold (so it'd be just punitive), but really?
You have provided a way the universe could be (the word my undergrad prof used for a universe with no causation was "Humeiform", as opposed to "uniform"): there could be a lot of sub-universes arranged spatially in a single possible world, in which infinitely many universes instantiate every possible sequence of events.
You don't have any way to explain why we should find ourselves in a sub-universe that seems to fall into miraculously well-regulated patterns, when the overwhelming likelihood if you pick a sub-universe at random is that wacky, irregular stuff will happen all the time. The anthropic principle won't help you, because there's no reason in this system for the observers to mostly find themselves in sub-universes with apparent regularity.
Less mysterious? "There is no reason anything should be as it is; it just is, at random" doesn't eliminate the mystery or even push it back another level or two - it wallows in mystery, it rests its head on a pillow of mystery at night, it has a middle-management job at the mystery factory, and it watches the mystery channel on TV every day. It's just so saturated in mystery that, having never found this much mystery in one place before, you have chosen to ignore it.
More parsimonious? Perhaps you can say "it's all random" in fewer words than you can recite a basic physics textbook, but three words that have no evidence backing them, no way to obtain such evidence, and no connection with the world in which we find ourselves have a much lower usefulness density than any verbose, overexplained thing you care to pick out from science. Parsimony is about getting your theory as small as you can without losing information. Your theory, since it contains no information, could be expressed by chirping like a cricket.
The fact that it predicts nothing makes it practically useless and uninteresting. If you think it's fun, it's no skin off my nose if you believe it, but believing things because they are fun and not because they inform your behavior in an instrumentally useful way or because you have evidence for them is not what we as a community are getting at, so it should not come as a surprise to you that (given the causal regularities of this website) you were poorly received.
This comment reminds me of nothing so much as a philosophical Zero Punctuation review. In other words, you win the thread. I recommend you imagine hearing this quote in a Yahtzee voice:
"There is no reason anything should be as it is; it just is, at random" doesn't eliminate the mystery or even push it back another level or two - it wallows in mystery, it rests its head on a pillow of mystery at night, it has a middle-management job at the mystery factory, and it watches the mystery channel on TV every day.
David Hume called causation the “cement of the universe”, and he was convinced that psychologically and in our practices, we can’t do without it.
Yet he was famously sceptical of any attempt to analyze causation in terms of necessary connections. For him, causation can only be defined in terms of a constant conjunction in space and time, and that is, I would add, no causation at all, but correlation. For every two events that seem causally connected can also, and without loss of the phenomenon, be described as just the first event, followed by the second. It’s really “just one damn thing after another”. It seems to me we still cannot, will not and need not make sense of the notion of causation (virtually no progress has been made since Hume's time).
There seems no need for another sort connection besides the spatio-temporal one, nor do we perceive any. In philosophy, a Hume world is a possible world defined in this way. All the phenomena are the same, but no necessary connections hold between the supposed relata. Maybe one should best imagine such a world as a game of life-world, but without a fundamental level governed by laws and forces; or as a movie, made of frames that are not intrinsically connected to each other. So, however strong the psychological forces that drive humans to accept further mysterious connections: Shouldn't we just stop worrying and accept living in a Hume world? Or are there actual arguments in favour of "real" causation?
Yes. There's the problem of order. What accounts for all the order in the world?It is remarkably ordered. If no special connections hold between events, why isn’t the world pure chaos? Or at least much more disordered? When two billard balls collide, never does one turn into an pink elephant.To explain this, men came up with laws of nature (self-sustained or enforced by a higher being).
So, there's the paradox: On the one hand, we have to postulate special connections to account for an orderly world like ours; on the other, we cannot give a proper account of these connections.
Inflationary cosmology to the rescue.
I won't go into the details (but see the nontechnical explanation and some further philosophical implications here).
Suffice it to say that
1) inflationary cosmology is mainstream physics, and
2) it postulates a spatially infinite universe in which every event with nonzero probability is realized infinitely many times.
How does this help to solve our paradox? The solution seems straightforward:
In an infinite universe of the right kind, order can locally emerge out of random events. Our universe is of the right kind.
So, we can account for the order in our observed (local) part of the universe.
Random events just happen, one after another, there is no need for mysterious causal connections. We throw them out but keep the order.
Problem solved.
Q: But if this is true, it’s the end of the world. Thinking, action, science, biases and many, many more concepts are causal ones. How can we do without them?
A: life is hard, get over it.
Q: But the theory is untestable?!
A: Falsificationism is dead; we have other evidences in favour (see below).
Q: But isn’t the theory self-defeating?
A: It is certainly odd to have a theory informed by experiences and high-level physics that tells us that, strictly speaking, there are no experiences or sciences. But it doesn’t seem incoherent to me climb the ladder and then throw it away.
And, looking at the bright side:
In addition to being non-mysterious and conceptually sparse, this might allow to solve some additional (would-be?) hard problems:
qualia, clustering of tropes, time travel-paradoxes, indeterministic processes: All easy or trivial when a thouroughly indeterministic universe is considered.
So. What do you think – if you can?