= 27d567bc2d48d9f40e9ccc20ea370b15)
Psychohistorian comments on Our society lacks good self-preservation mechanisms - Less Wrong
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
= 783df68a0f980790206b9ea87794c5b6)
Loading…= b715d02e85f7b3b4ae65ca3d3e450868)
Subscribe to RSS Feed
Powered by Reddit
= f037147d6e6c911a85753b9abdedda8d)
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
Comments (105)
It is one thing to say "Something must be done!" with a tone of righteous superiority. It is another thing entirely to specify what must be done. Many of these risks do not seem existential to me, some (like dystopia) should really be properly buried as ideas (Bostrom actually dismisses this idea in that paper). The ones that do seem realistically existential seem almost impossible to prepare against on any realistic scale - aliens, gray goo, uploads, and massive global warfare/conquest don't seem like they're going to be sensitive to many investments we make now, since they're either too small and specific or too large and non-specific to address generally.
You also forgot to list the biggest problem: "Something Unforseen."
It's not terribly constructive to say we lack good self-preservation mechanisms without at least hand-waving what good self preservation mechanisms might look like and how we could theoretically try to start having them. The mere fact that we could all die at any moment is not much of a cause for alarm if there's really nothing we can do about it.
Edit: My general point is clarified in a response to a response to this post.
This is a huge claim. You're claiming first of all that the odds of succumbing to a truly existential event are higher than not. You don't (IMO) provide evidence to support this - you provide some evidence that we may have had really catastrophic events in the past, but, again, only 100% is existential, and you do not finish off your examples - "Hitler could have won" and "Hitler could have won and created a repressive regime that lasted for the remainder of human history" are two very different claims, and the former is not existential. Second, you claim that if we take some steps, we can expect such events not to happen - it is because we lack an "effective long-term preservation system" that we can expect to be destroyed completely.
Thus, you have, to my understanding, made two claims: one about the likelihood of existential events, and one about the likelihood of us being able to mitigate them. Again, to my evaluation, you have provided compelling evidence for neither of these conclusions; indeed you've provided virtually no evidence for either of these conclusion (probability, not possibility). That is the root of my criticism of not providing solutions: you claim solutions are possible, desirable, and effective, and you do not provide any evidence to support this claim.
Thus, my criticism of your tone as "righteous" is because you seem to be making a strong, "deep" claim without providing adequate supporting evidence or argument. It is not a criticism of your word choice. I have absolutely no problem with people posting about problems that occur to them that they don't know how to solve. I do have a problem with people making strong claims with a definitive tone without providing adequate supporting evidence.
I admit this may all hinge on a disagreement in definition over "existential." I take existential to require true obliteration. Gray goo would reach this, as would the-simulation-loses-power or every-atom-splits or humanity-is-enslaved-by-something-forever. "Nuclear holocaust kills billions and it takes ten thousand years to recover" does not count in my mind, as it is not terminal. Similarly, "Hitler reigns for ten thousand years" is also non-existential (at least for humanity as a whole); If recovery occurs, even after a fairly large gap, it does not seem to count as existential. This view is consistent with Bostrom's definition in the linked paper. With a weaker definition of existential, it is quite possible that there is no disagreement here, in which I have the (smaller) criticism that you should have clarified this at the beginning.
If we had actually had 6 "near misses", then that would be pertinent evidence. In which case, maybe they should be listed, their probabilities and potential impact estimated.
I now get what lead to this confusion. You've referred to both "existential" and "major civilizational-level catastrophes" without much effort to distinguish between the two, though they differ in both extent and probability by a few orders of magnitude. I assumed from the Bostrom paper citation and the long list of existential threats that the article in general was about existential risks, which, on a rereading, it isn't.
My concern over showing that something could reasonably be done remains, but you do provide appropriate evidence regarding civilization-level catastrophes. It might be worth a sentence or two clarifying that your concern is civ-level or greater, rather than specifically existential, though I may be the only one who misread the focus here.
I don't think that's the main thrust of his complaint. Lack of specifics is the main problem. If you say "Something must be done!" but not what, then the tone of the writing is moot, so far as righteousness-detectors go.