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Eliezer_Yudkowsky comments on Timeless Decision Theory: Problems I Can't Solve - Less Wrong
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"I believe X to be like me" => "whatever I decide, X will decide also" seems tenuous without some proof of likeness that is beyond any guarantee possible in humans.
I can accept your analysis in the context of actors who have irrevocably committed to some mechanically predictable decision rule, which, along with perfect information on all the causal inputs to the rule, gives me perfect predictions of their behavior, but I'm not sure such an actor could ever trust its understanding of an actual human.
Maybe you could aspire to such determinism in a proven-correct software system running on proven-robust hardware.
Well, yeah, this is primarily a theory for AIs dealing with other AIs.
You could possibly talk about human applications if you knew that the N of you had the same training as rationalists, or if you assigned probabilities to the others having such training.
For X to be able to model the decisions of Y with 100% accuracy, wouldn't X require a more sophisticated model?
If so, why would supposedly symmetrical models retain this symmetry?
Nope. http://arxiv.org/abs/1401.5577