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Gavin comments on Timeless Decision Theory: Problems I Can't Solve - Less Wrong
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Comments (153)
Well, obviously. But the more interesting question is what if you suspect, but are not certain, that your opponent is Eliezer Yudkowsky? Assuming identity makes the problem too easy.
My position is that I'd expect a reasonable chance that an arbitrary, frequent LW participant playing this game against you would also end with 10 (C,C)s. I'd suggest actually running this as an experiment if I didn't think I'd lose money on the deal...
If we wanted to be clever we could include Eliezer playing against himself (just report back to him the same value) as a possibility, though if it's a high probability that he faces himself it seems pointless.
I'd be happy to front the (likely loss of) $10.
It might be possible to make it more like a the true prisoner's dilemma if we could come up with two players each of whom want the money donated to a cause that they consider worthy but the other player opposes or considers ineffective.
Though I have plenty of paperclips, sadly I lack the resources to successfully simulate Eliezer's true PD . . .
Meaningful results would probably require several iterations of the game, though, with different players (also, the expected loss in my scenario was $5 per game).
I seem to recall Douglas Hofstadter did an experiment with several of his more rational friends, and was distressed by the globally rather suboptimal outcome. I do wonder if we on LW would do better, with or without Eliezer?