thomblake comments on Being saner about gender and rationality - Less Wrong
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I would be most illuminated if you would share a justification in favor of having ongoing bad feelings (as opposed to a momentary notification of a possible problem), that does not also work as a justification in favor of death.
I feel oddly like you didn't read the rest of my comment. Are we talking past each other again?
The simplest justification is that they are 'uniquely human', a part of our nature and the human experience. All justifications must follow from what we are, or else what are they to rest on?
On the face of it, this serves as a justification for death. However, death is a one-off problem whose removal would hardly impact the nature and character of one's life. Removing 'bad' feelings would entail scraping out a decent-sized chunk of what it is to be a human.
And don't think the problem of death is so easily solved.
So, if I were to never become depressed again, I'm no longer a human? That doesn't make any sense to me.
Bear in mind, I'm not proposing Superhappy-ness. I'm simply saying that after the initial moment of pain or sorrow or frustration or grief or embarrassment or whatever, the utility of that feeling being continued drops off dramatically. And if something bothers you emotionally for, say, an hour (let alone frequently) the odds are good that you are wasting your time. (And yes, that does mean I've been doing a bit of time-wasting here recently.)
Unless I'm misunderstanding 'utility' as you're using it here, it seems like you're begging the question. To say that "bad feelings don't serve utility" doesn't really seem to be saying much at all; this is part of why I felt the need to put scare quotes around 'bad' above - bad feelings are by definition bad.
Pot, meet kettle. ;-)
If you're going to accuse me of committing a logical fallacy, please do me the service of doing so explicitly, and pointing out where it happened.
Here:
That isn't even remotely a justification for actually having bad feelings.
You didn't show where I was begging the question, or was that not what you meant to imply above?
While I'm not sure formalism is the right way to go, let's try it:
.1. 'Bad' feelings are part of what it is to be uniquely human.
.2. Our standards for what is good/acceptable flow from our nature.
.3. By 2, any standard of the good that runs counter to our nature is not a good standard.
.4. By 3 and 1, a standard of the good that considers 'bad' feelings to be bad is not a good standard.
Perhaps not the most helpful way of putting it, but hopefully that works. Any sign of a fallacy there? (note: 'the naturalistic fallacy' is not an acceptable answer)
Bad feelings are not unique to humans, so how are they "uniquely" human? And even if they were, why is being "uniquely human" all that's required for something to be good?
Why does that mean our standards are actually good?
Our nature includes violence, so by this argument, violence is a good standard.
So then in your opinion, I didn't commit a logical fallacy after all?
ETA: Or were you just changing the subject?