cousin_it comments on Are calibration and rational decisions mutually exclusive? (Part two) - Less Wrong
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Another intriguing point for the discussion.
Jaynes cites Zellner and Thornber's experiments comparing the performance of Bayesian vs frequentist methods. Bayes won in both cases, I presume on coverage too. The reason for that was pretty funny: quote, "By the time all necessary provisions for a 'fair' contest have been incorporated into the experiment, all the ingredients of the Bayesian theory (prior distribution, loss function, etc.) will necessarily be present... The simulation can only demonstrate the mathematical theorem." In other words, frequentist confidence coverage might sometimes win on real-world examples like the Avogadro number, but Bayes will win any arranged contests precisely because they're arranged. :-)
To those who feel anti-Bayesian today I recommend Shalizi's blog, and also the following joke I found on the net: