wedrifid comments on Thomas C. Schelling's "Strategy of Conflict" - Less Wrong

81 Post author: cousin_it 28 July 2009 04:08PM

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Comment author: wedrifid 31 January 2014 06:46:38PM 0 points [-]

I have reread the context and I find I concur with wedrifid_2009.

In two player zero sum games, vengeance (hurting self to hurt other more) is impossible, as are threats and destruction in general -- because the total score is always the same.

Vengeance is impossible, threats are irrelevant but destruction most certainly is not. Don't confuse the arbitrary constraint "the total score is always the same" with the notion that nothing 'destructive' can occur in such a game. What is prevented (to rational participants) is destruction for the purpose of game theoretic influence.

Consider a spherical cow in (a spaceship with me in a) vacuum. We are stranded and have a fixed reserve of energy. I am going to kill the spherical cow. I will dismember her. I will denature the proteins that make up her flesh. Then I will eat her. Because destroying her means I get to use all the energy and oxygen for myself. This includes the energy that was in the cow before I destroyed her. It's nothing personal. There was no threat. I was not retaliating. There was neither punishment nor cooperation. Just destruction.

ie. One of these things is not like the other things, one of these things just doesn't belong:

vengeance, punishment, destruction, team cooperation, etc