Cyan comments on Thomas C. Schelling's "Strategy of Conflict" - Less Wrong
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Comments (148)
Could you clarify that last bit for me? You seem to have a valid point but I don't think I can glean it from that wording. I can imagine plenty of scenarios in which competitive zero-sum game theory will suggest that I nuke my neighbour. The most obvious example being if I kill them all and take their stuff and I think I can get away with it. Common interests appear not to be necessary.
Of course some real world zero-sum games are ruthless too, but I haven't seen anything as bad as the nuke game, and it is variable-sum. Peace benefits everyone, but if one side in an arms race starts getting ahead, both sides know there will be war which harms both. If the game was zero-sum, war would've happened long ago and with weaker weapons.
The book gives an example of both Soviets and Americans expending effort on submarine-detection technologies while both desperately hoping that such technologies don't exist, because undetectable submarines with ICBMs are such a great retaliation guarantee that no one attacks anyone.
Thanks, that makes sense. It also brings to mind some key points from Robin's talk on existential risks.