In other words, like most things that are counterintuitive, these findings are counterintuitive precisely because their applicability in real life is the exception rather than the rule; by all means let's recognize the exceptions, but without forgetting what they are.

The examples in the original post are not exceptions. It just takes a while to recognise them under the veneers of social norms and instinctual behaviours.

The broken radio, for example, is exactly what I see when attempting to communicate with those who would present themselves as higher status. Blatant stupidity (broken receiver) is often a signal, not a weakness. (And I can incorporate this understanding when dealing with said people, which I find incredibly useful.)

In the post I tried pretty hard to show the applicability of the techniques to real life, and so did Schelling. Apparently we haven't succeeded. Maybe some more quotes will tip the scales? Something of a more general nature, not ad hoc trickery?

If one is committed to punish a certain type of behavior when it reaches certain limits, but the limits are not carefully and objectively defined, the party threatened will realize when the time comes to decide whether the threat must be enforced or not, his interest and that of the threatening party will coincide in an attempt to avoid the mutually unpleasant consequences.

Or what do you say to this:

Among the legal privileges of corporations, two that are mentioned in textbooks are the right to sue and the "right" to be sued. Who wants to be sued! But the right to be sued is the power to make a promise: to borrow money, to enter a contract, to do business with someone who might be damaged. If suit does arise, the "right" seems a liability in retrospect; beforehand it was a prerequisite to doing business.

Or this:

If each party agrees to send a million dollars to the Red Cross on condition the other does, each may be tempted to cheat if the other contributes first, and each one's anticipation of the other's cheating will inhibit agreement. But if the contribution is divided into successive small contributions, each can try the other's good faith for a small price. Furthermore, since each can keep the other on short tether to the finish, no one ever need risk more than one small contribution at a time. Finally, this change in the incentive structure itself takes most of the risk out of the initial contribution; the value of established trust is made obviously visible to both.

Or this:

When there are two objects to negotiate, the decision to negotiate them simultaneously or in separate forums or at separate times is by no means neutral to the outcome, particularly when there is a latent extortionate threat that can be exploited only if it can be attached to some ordinary, legitimate, bargaining situation.

I'm not even being particularly picky on which paragraphs to quote. The whole book is like that. To me the main takeaway was not local trickery, but a general way of thinking about conflict situations; I started seeing them everywhere, all the time.