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wedrifid comments on Thomas C. Schelling's "Strategy of Conflict" - Less Wrong
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Comments (148)
The examples in the original post are not exceptions. It just takes a while to recognise them under the veneers of social norms and instinctual behaviours.
The broken radio, for example, is exactly what I see when attempting to communicate with those who would present themselves as higher status. Blatant stupidity (broken receiver) is often a signal, not a weakness. (And I can incorporate this understanding when dealing with said people, which I find incredibly useful.)
Good point, though the results of this are frequently as disastrous as in my observation about the broken radio trick. (Much of Dilbert can be seen as examples thereof.)
I think you're right. It does seem to me that in the current environment the 'signal status though incomprehension' gives real losses to people rather frequently, as is the case with PHBs. I wonder though, how much my observations of the phenomenon are biased by selection. Perhaps by am far more likely to notice this sort of silliness when it is quite obvious that the signaller is going against his own self interest. That is certainly when it gets on my nerves the most!
Not quite. There is an element of cooperation involved but the payoff structure is qualitatively different, as is the timing. If you defect in the PD then the other person is better of defecting as well. If you break your radio the other guy is best off not breaking his. The PD is simultaneous while the radio is not. (So if you break your radio the other guy is able to hunt you down and bitch slap you.)