tuli comments on Thomas C. Schelling's "Strategy of Conflict" - Less Wrong
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Comments (148)
Could you clarify that last bit for me? You seem to have a valid point but I don't think I can glean it from that wording. I can imagine plenty of scenarios in which competitive zero-sum game theory will suggest that I nuke my neighbour. The most obvious example being if I kill them all and take their stuff and I think I can get away with it. Common interests appear not to be necessary.
Just remember that once you nuke (that is destroy) something, you have left the bounds of zero-sum game and quite likely entered a negative sum game (though you may end up having positive outcome, the sum is negative).
Well isn't this exactly the problem cousin_it is referring to when the game is non-zero sum? It means that I might need to take 1000 utils from you in order to gain 50 utils for myself. (or even: I might need to take 1000 utils from you in order to limit my losses to 50 utils).
It's possible that it will be a negative sum. It is also possible in principle that it has become a positive sum. The sign of the 'sum' doesn't actually seem to be the important part of the quoted context here, rather the presence or absence of a shared interest.