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Technologos comments on Thomas C. Schelling's "Strategy of Conflict" - Less Wrong
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Comments (148)
In the radio example, there is no way for me to convince you that the receive capability is truly broken. Given that, there is no reason for me to actually break the receive ability, and you should distrust any claim on my part that the receive ability has been broken.
But Schelling must have been able to follow this reasoning, so what point was he trying to illustrate with the radio example?
Even if I distrust that you have a broken radio, as long as I prefer going to meet you (accepting the additional cost therein entailed) to never meeting you or meeting after an indefinitely long time, I will still go to wherever you say you are. If both people's radios are unbroken after the crash, whoever transmits the "receiver broken" signal probably gets the easier time of it.
This game is essentially the (repeated?) game of chicken, as long as "claim broken receiver and other person capitulates" > "both players admit unbroken" > "capitulate to other person's claim" > "neither player capitulates while both claim broken receivers".
Conveniently, this appears to be the broader point Schelling was trying to make. Flamboyant disabling of one's options often puts one in a better negotiating position. Hence, the American garrison in West Berlin.