PhilGoetz comments on A Normative Rule for Decision-Changing Metrics - Less Wrong
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Comments (17)
That is the usual form that this error takes. If you choose to define people differently, but still as a binary predicate, you're just going to have some other horrible results elsewhere in your ethical system.
I'd like to see some support for this.
It's much nicer to be able to say that a sperm+egg only gradually become a person, than to have to argue about when its personhood transitions from 0 to 1.
I don't think this eliminates much real inconvenience, although it might soothe ruffled feathers in very superficial discussions. If you can have fractional people, that creates the following problems:
The idea of fractional people is less common that the idea that personhood is a cluster of properties in thingspace, and various beings partake of those properties to a greater or lesser extent.
This seems to carve reality at its joints more than the idea of fractional people, but is certainly still problematic.
It may seem difficult, but we already, in practice, have many classes of fractional persons and it doesn't seem too problematic.
Juveniles, for example, or the handicapped (who have rights in varying degrees - a permanent vegetable doesn't have the right to not be killed by another person, but a low-functioning autistic most certainly does); and past examples of attempts to make someone personier haven't been too bad. (I think here of Terri Schiavo, and the attempts by right-wingers to make her seem less brain-dead than she was - remember Frist's diagnosis-via-videotape?)