It's interesting that we came upon the same idea from different directions. For me it fell out of Tegmark's multiverse. What could consequences be, except logical consequences, if all mathematical structures exist? The fact that you said it would take a long series of posts to explain your idea threw me off, and I was kind of surprised when you said congratulations. I thought I might be offering a different solution. (I spent days polishing the article in the expectation that I might have to defend it fiercely.)

And yet you found a reflectively consistent decision algorithm long before you found a decision-system-algorithm-finding algorithm. That's not coincidence. The latter problem is much harder.

Umm, I haven't actually found a reflectively consistent decision algorithm yet, since the proposal has huge gaps that need to be filled. I have little idea how to handle logical uncertainty in a systematic way, or whether expected utility maximization makes sense in that context.

The rest of your paragraph makes good points. But I'm not sure what you mean by "metaethics, a solved problem". Can you give a link?

One way to approach the meta problem may be to consider the meta-meta problem: why did evolution create us with so much "common sense" on these types of problems? Why do we have the meta algorithm apparently "built in" when it doesn't seem like it would have offered much advantage in the ancestral environment?