This is a fascinating way of looking at it.
My first thought was to reply, "Yes, most worlds may need to be pruned a la Hanson's mangled worlds, but that doesn't mean you can end up with a single global world without violating Special Relativity, linearity, unitarity, continuity, CPT invariance, etc."
But on second thought this seems to be arguing even further, for the sort of deep revolution in QM that Scott wants - a reformulation that would nakedly expose the computational limits, and make the ontology no more extravagant than the fastest computation it can manage within a single world's quantum computer. So this would have to reduce the proliferation of worlds to sub-exponential, if I understand it correctly, based on the strange reasoning that if we can't do exponential computations in one world then this should be nakedly revealed in a sub-exponential global universe.
But you still cannot end up with a single world, for all the reasons already given - and quantum computers do not seem to be merely as powerful as classical computers, they do speed things up. So that argues that the ontology should be more than polynomial, even if sub-truly-exponential.
Some other thoughts about the MWI, that come to my mind after a bit more thinking:
Here is a version of the Schroedinger's cat experiment that would let anyone to test the MWI for himself: Let us devise a quantum process that has 99 percent probability of releasing a nerve-gas in a room that kills humans without any pain. If I'd be really sure of the MWI, I would have no problems going into the room and press the button to start the experiment. In my own experience I would simply come out of the room unscratched for certain as it will be the only world I w...
Eliezer Yudkowsky and Scott Aaronson - Percontations: Artificial Intelligence and Quantum Mechanics
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