The three-sentence version is: Factor your uncertainty over (impossible) possible worlds into a causal graph that includes nodes corresponding to the unknown outputs of known computations; condition on the known initial conditions of your decision computation to screen off factors influencing the decision-setup; compute the counterfactuals in your expected utility formula by surgery on the node representing the logical output of that computation.

I'm trying to understand the difference between this formulation and mine. Interestingly, Eliezer seems to have specified a "causal" timeless decision theory, whereas mine could be described as an "evidential" TDT. In my formulation, you'd compute the expected utility of a strategy (i.e., mapping of inputs to outputs) T by taking "S is logically equivalent to T" as a (provisional) axiom, then recomputing logical uncertainties and expected utility.

The "evidential" approach seems simpler. What advantage does the "causal" approach have? Sorry if this is obvious, but my knowledge of Pearl is very limited.