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Eliezer_Yudkowsky comments on Ingredients of Timeless Decision Theory - Less Wrong
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I am unable to attach a truth condition to these sentences - I can't imagine two different ways that reality could be which would make the statements true or alternatively false.
http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Free_will_(solution)
Do you mean that the phrases "free will exists" and "free will does not exist" are both incoherent?
If I want to, I can assign a meaning to "free will" in which it is tautologically true of causal universes as such, and applied to agents, is true of some agents but not others. But you used the term, you tell me what it means to you.
You used the term first. You called it a "dead horse" and "about as easy as a problem can get and still be Confusing". I would think this meant that you have a clear concept of what it means. And it can't be a tautology, because tautologies are not dead horses.
I can at least say that, to me, "Free will exists" implies "No Omega can predict with certainty whether I will one-box or two-box." (This is not an "if and only if" because I don't want to say that a random process has free will; nor that an undecidable algorithm has free will.)
I thought about saying: "Free will does not exist" if and only if "Consciousness is epiphenomenal". That sounds dangerously tautological, but closer to what I mean.
I can't think how to say anything more descriptive than what I wrote in my first comment above. I understand that saying there is free will seems to imply that I am not an algorithm; and that that seems to require some weird spiritualism or vitalism. But that is vague and fuzzy to me; whereas it is clear that it doesn't make sense to worry about what I should do in the worlds where I can't actually choose what I will do. I choose to live with the vague paradox rather than the clear-cut one.
ADDED: I should clarify that I don't believe in free will. I believe there is no such thing. But, when choosing how to act, I don't consider that possibility, because of the reasons I gave previously.
Then you've got the naive incoherent version of "free will" stuck in your head. Read the links.
http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Free_will
http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Freewill(solution)
All right, I read all of the non-italicized links, except for the "All posts on Less Wrong tagged Free Will", trusting that one of them would say something relevant to what I've said here. But alas, no.
All of those links are attempts to argue about the truth value of "there is free will", or about whether the concept of free will is coherent, or about what sort of mental models might cause someone to believe in free will.
None of those things are at issue here. What I am talking about is what happens when you are trying to compute something over different possible worlds, where what your computation actually does is different in these different worlds. When you must compare expected value in possible worlds in which there is no free will, to expected value in possible worlds in which there is free will, and then make a choice; what that choice actually does is not independent of what possible world you end up in. This means that you can't apply expectation-maximization in the usual way. The counterintuitive result, I think, is that you should act in the way that maximizes expected value given that there is free will, regardless of the computed expected value given that there is not free will.
As I mentioned, I don't believe in free will. But I think, based on a history of other concepts or frameworks that seemed paradoxical but were eventually worked out satisfactorily, that it's possible there's something to the naive notion of "free will".
We have a naive notion of "free will" which, so far, no one has been able to connect up with our understanding of physics in a coherent way. This is powerful evidence that it doesn't exist, or isn't even a meaningful concept. It isn't proof, however; I could say the same thing about "consciousness", which as far as I can see really shouldn't exist.
All attempts that I've seen so far to parse out what free will means, including Eliezer's careful and well-written essays linked to above, fail to noticeably reduce the probability I assign to there being naive "free will", because the probability that there is some error in the description or mapping or analogies made is always much higher than the very-low prior probability that I assign to there being "free will".
I'm not arguing in favor of free will. I'm arguing that, when considering an action to take that is conditioned on the existence of free will, you should not do the usual expected-utility calculations, because the answer to the free will question determines what it is you're actually doing when you choose an action to take, in a way that has an asymmetry such that, if there is any possibility epsilon > 0 that free will exists, you should assume it exists.
(BTW, I think a philosopher who wished to defend free will could rightfully make the blanket assertion against all of Eliezer's posts that they assume what they are trying to prove. It's pointless to start from the position that you are an algorithm in a Blocks World, and argue from there against free will. There's some good stuff in there, but it's not going to convince someone who isn't already reductionist or determinist.)
I have stated exactly what I mean by the term "free will" and it makes this sentence nonsense; there is no world in which you do not have free will. And I see no way that your will could possibly be any freer than it already is. There is no possible amendment to reality which you can consistently describe, that would make your free will any freer than it is in our own timeless and deterministic (though branching) universe.
What do you mean by "free will" that makes your sentence non-nonsense? Don't say "if we did actually have free will", tell me how reality could be different.
That's the part I don't buy. I'm not saying it's false, but I don't see any good reason to think it's true. (I think I read the posts where you explained why you believe it, but I might have missed some.)