Eliezer_Yudkowsky comments on Ingredients of Timeless Decision Theory - Less Wrong

43 Post author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 19 August 2009 01:10AM

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Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 22 August 2009 11:25:06PM *  7 points [-]

When you must compare expected value in possible worlds in which there is no free will, to expected value in possible worlds in which there is free will

I have stated exactly what I mean by the term "free will" and it makes this sentence nonsense; there is no world in which you do not have free will. And I see no way that your will could possibly be any freer than it already is. There is no possible amendment to reality which you can consistently describe, that would make your free will any freer than it is in our own timeless and deterministic (though branching) universe.

What do you mean by "free will" that makes your sentence non-nonsense? Don't say "if we did actually have free will", tell me how reality could be different.

Comment author: brian_jaress 23 August 2009 05:43:49PM 0 points [-]

in our own timeless and deterministic (though branching) universe.

That's the part I don't buy. I'm not saying it's false, but I don't see any good reason to think it's true. (I think I read the posts where you explained why you believe it, but I might have missed some.)