I think I'm beginning to remember...(from "Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance," which was 15 years ago, for me)...
Everyone, dualists and physical materialists alike, may agree that the experience of redness is a real physical phenomenon (as something that occurs in the brain). But isn't the qualia/dualism debate about whether a red object possesses a property (quality) of "redness"?
Am I being down-voted because you don't think objects can possess qualia (like redness or beauty, etc) or because you don't agree this is what the debate between physical materialists and dualists is about? I think it's important to remember what the debate is originally about, because the way it's being framed here, it doesn't seem like there would be one.
http://esr.ibiblio.org/?p=1192#more-1192
ADDED: Even if you disagree with ESR's take, and many will, this is the clearest definition I have seen on what qualia is. So it should present a useful starting point, even for those who strongly disagree, to argue from.