Am I being down-voted because you don't think objects can possess qualia (like redness or beauty, etc) or because you don't agree this is what the debate between physical materialists and dualists is about? I think it's important to remember what the debate is originally about, because the way it's being framed here, it doesn't seem like there would be one.
Not downvoting you, but the debate isn't about that. It would be more about "even if you knew all the physical facts about the brain, how those things implement the various algorithms the brain implements, etc, would there still be some aspect of redness that 'transcends' that, an epiphenomenon that one needs ADDITIONAL facts to learn about from the outside?" (well, okay, I guess that isn't exactly true of all flavors of dualism... Since the flavors of dualism that have the dual properties actually have physical effects and so on would be a bit different, but then arguably one could even rephrase that sort of belief so that it's not even a form of dualism anymore, or becomes an epiphenomena style of dualism)
http://esr.ibiblio.org/?p=1192#more-1192
ADDED: Even if you disagree with ESR's take, and many will, this is the clearest definition I have seen on what qualia is. So it should present a useful starting point, even for those who strongly disagree, to argue from.