Peterdjones comments on ESR's New Take on Qualia - Less Wrong

3 Post author: billswift 21 August 2009 09:26AM

You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.

Comments (51)

You are viewing a single comment's thread. Show more comments above.

Comment author: Peterdjones 21 January 2013 06:19:39PM -1 points [-]

Interestingly, I don't think he bluntly said the (perhaps) most fundamental part of his position: what the color red looks like is a fact about Mary's brain, not about the color red. This also explains how qualia are essentially incommunicable: I don't have Mary's brain, so I can't really observe what it is like for information to be processed in that brain.

That doesn't explain why qualia are incommunciable, since others stuff that happens in brains is communicale. We expect Mary to understand everything except qualia.

Comment author: simplicio 21 January 2013 07:24:16PM 2 points [-]

They are incommunicable because you cannot occupy any arbitrary brainstate you want to. See the ability hypothesis.

Comment author: Peterdjones 21 January 2013 07:26:16PM -2 points [-]

To repeat my point: that doens't explain why other metnal content is communicable.

Comment author: simplicio 21 January 2013 08:59:21PM 2 points [-]

Other mental content is expressible propositionally, whereas to duplicate someone's qualia you have to literally duplicate their brainstate (or at least the functional equivalent of their brainstate).

When I say "Greece is in Europe" I am making a propositional claim that is relatively independent of the precise details of how my brain represents that belief, versus how your brain does. Maybe I am picturing a map, while you are remembering Greece's EU membership. For the purposes of communicating that proposition, nobody cares about what your neural activity looks like when you think about Greece being in Europe. The description is higher level: many brainstates map to a single belief state. This is what makes it communicable.

Comment author: Peterdjones 03 March 2013 02:45:07PM 1 point [-]

Other mental content is expressible propositionally, whereas to duplicate someone's qualia you have to literally duplicate their brainstate (or at least the functional equivalent of their brainstate).

To duplicate something, you of course have to duplicate it. That isn't really the point. What you are tacitly assuming is that qualia cannot be communicated, know or understood without duplication. ie, there is something special about them in that regard. That is how that approach fails as a dissolution. Rather than showing there is nothing special about qualia, it assumes there is something special.

Other mental content is expressible propositionally, whereas to duplicate someone's qualia you have to literally duplicate their brainstate (or at least the functional equivalent of their brainstate).

I don't know about yours, but my qualia don't look like neural activity.

Comment author: TheOtherDave 03 March 2013 04:21:03PM 0 points [-]

I don't know about yours, but my qualia don't look like neural activity.

(blink) Can you clarify how you can know something like this about peterdjones' qualia and not know it about simplicio's? That is, what evidence do you have for the former that isn't equally evidence for the latter?

Comment author: [deleted] 21 January 2013 08:37:05PM 2 points [-]

Other mental content is communicable because it's a lot simpler. All of the data of an entire human brain state, even considering only a snapshot taken at one instant in time, is many orders of magnitude of quantity/complexity beyond what the conscious mind is capable of considering and understanding.

Comment author: Peterdjones 03 March 2013 02:34:58PM 0 points [-]

Other mental content is [...] a lot simpler

Is there independent evidence for that?