SilasBarta comments on Timeless Identity Crisis - Less Wrong
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Comments (33)
Yes, and here's what it would look like: I anticipate a 1/2 + e probability of the other person doing the same thing as me in the true PD. I'll use the payoff matrix of
C D
C (3,3) (0,5)
D (5,0) (1,1)
where the first value is my utility. The expected payoff is then (after a little algebra):
If I cooperate: 3/2 + 3e; if I defect: 3 - 4e
Defection has a higher payoff as long as e is less than 3/14 (total probability of other person doing what I do = 10/14). So you should cooperate as long as you have over 0.137 bits of evidence that they will do what you do. Does the assumption that other people's algorithm has a minor resemblance to mine get me that?
Yes, and that's the tough bullet to bite: me being more charitable, irrespective the impact of my charitable action, causes (me to observe) other people being more charitable.