Vladimir_Nesov comments on MWI, weird quantum experiments and future-directed continuity of conscious experience - Less Wrong

4 Post author: SforSingularity 18 September 2009 04:45PM

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Comment author: AllanCrossman 19 September 2009 01:19:29AM *  2 points [-]

Though not exactly a quantum immortality believer, I take it more seriously than most...

Objections mostly seem to come down to the idea that, if I split in two, and then one of me dies a minute later, its consciousness doesn't magically transfer over to the other me. And so "one of me" has really died.

However, I see this case as being about as bad as losing a minute's worth of memory. On the reductive view of personal identity, there's no obvious difference. There is no soul flying about.

Is there a difference between these four cases:

  • I instantly lose a minute's memory due to nanobot action
  • I am knocked unconscious and lose a minute's memory
  • I die and am replaced by a stored copy of me from a minute ago
  • I die, but I had split into two a minute ago

I'm not seeing it...

(Well, admittedly in the final case I also "gain" a minute's memory.)

Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 19 September 2009 01:27:05AM *  1 point [-]

In all the cases you listed, the remaining-you has the same moral weight as the you-if-nothing-would-happen. Arguably, the person on one side of a quantum coin only owns a half of moral weight, just like other events that you weight with Born probabilities, so the analogy breaks.