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wedrifid comments on Hypothetical Paradoxes - Less Wrong
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Newcomb's problem shown two boxes and given a choice. I am always subject to the standard laws of physics. There is nothing in the problem to suggest that applying a naive conception of free will would be any less naive in the circumstance of the hypothetical than it is anywhere else.
There is nothing wrong with Newcomb's problem. If someone gets confused, imagines paradoxes or makes a poor decision then that is a problem with either the decision theory they are using or in their application thereof. If a particular description of the problem included details about how a decision theory should handle the problem then that part would have to be investigated to see if the problems described by Psycho apply.
This is correct; that sentence did not fit in well with the rest of the point and has been amended accordingly. The assumptions necessary to use Newcomb's to refute CDT are paradoxical; the hypothetical itself is not, though we are very much prone to think of it incorrectly, because naive free will is so basic to our intuition.