The analogy is between having imperfect information of your future choice (while choosing), and imperfect information of your own tastes (while tasting).

That still doesn't work. In making my choice (per AnnaSalamon's drawing of Eliezer_Yudkowsky's TDT causal model for Newcomb's problem), I get to disconnect my decision-making process from its parents (parents not shown in AnnaSalamon's drawing because they'd be disconnected anyway). I do not disconnect the influence of my genes when learning whether I like cilantro.

Moreover, while I can present myself with reasons to change my mind, I cannot (knowingly) feed myself relevant evidence that I do not like cilantro, arbitrarily changing the probability of a given past ancestry.

None of this Newcomb's problem stuff is relevant to quantum physics; even if we were living in a non-quantum, Newtonian world, we would have all the same experiences related to this problem.

Yes, the Everett branch concept isn't necessary, but still, the weirdness of the implications of the situation do indeed apply to whatever physical laws contain it.