Stuart_Armstrong comments on Avoiding doomsday: a "proof" of the self-indication assumption - Less Wrong
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This is basically the same as C'. The probability of being behind a blue door remains at 99%, both for those who are killed, and for those who survive.
There cannot be a continuous series between the two extremes, since in order to get from one to the other, you have to make some people go from existing in the first case, to not existing in the last case. This implies that they go from knowing something in the first case, to not knowing anything in the last case. If the other people (who always exist) know this fact, then this can affect their subjective probability. If they don't know, then we're talking about an entirely different situation.
PS: Thanks for your assiduous attempts to explain your position, it's very useful.