DanArmak comments on Avoiding doomsday: a "proof" of the self-indication assumption - Less Wrong

18 Post author: Stuart_Armstrong 23 September 2009 02:54PM

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Comment author: Unknowns 25 September 2009 07:37:25PM 2 points [-]

The reason is that "I" could be anyone out of the full set of two trials. So: there is a 25% chance there both trials ended with red-doored survivors; a 25% chance that both trials ended with blue-doored survivors; and a 50% chance that one ended with a red door, one with a blue.

If both were red, I have a red door (100% chance). If both were blue, I have a blue door (100% chance). But if there was one red and one blue, then there are a total of 100 people, 99 blue and one red, and I could be any of them. So in this case there is a 99% chance I am behind a blue door.

Putting these things together, if I calculate correctly, the total probability here (in the case of two trials) is that I have a 25.5% chance of being behind a red door, and a 74.5% chance of being behind a blue door. In a similar way you can show that as you add more trials, your probability will get ever closer to 99% of being behind a blue door.

Comment author: DanArmak 25 September 2009 07:48:59PM 0 points [-]

Thanks! I think this comment is the best so far for demonstrating the confusion (well, I was confused :-) about the different possible meanings of the phrase "you are an observer chosen from such and such set". Perhaps a more precise and unambiguous phrasing could be used.