JGWeissman comments on Avoiding doomsday: a "proof" of the self-indication assumption - Less Wrong
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I disagree, but I am inclined to disagree by default: one of the themes that motivates me to post here is the idea that frequentist calculations are typically able to give precisely the same answer as Bayesian calculations.
I also see no trouble with wearing my frequentist hat when thinking about single coin flips: I can still reason that if I flipped a fair coin arbitrarily many times, the relative frequency of a head converges almost surely to one half, and that relative frequency represents my chance of getting a head on a single flip.
I believe that the observers who survive would. To clarify my thinking on this, I considered doing this experiment with a trillion doors, where one of the doors is again red, and all of the others blue. Let's say I survive this huge version of the experiment.
As a survivor, I know I was almost certainly behind a blue door to start with. Hence a tail would have implied my death with near certainty. Yet I'm not dead, so it is extremely unlikely that I got tails. That means I almost certainly got heads. I have gained information about the coin flip.
I think talking about 'observers' might be muddling the issue here. We could talk instead about creatures that don't understand the experiment, and the result would be the same. Say we have two Petri dishes, one dish containing a single bacterium, and the other containing a trillion. We randomly select one of the bacteria (representing me in the original door experiment) to stain with a dye. We flip a coin: if it's heads, we kill the lone bacterium, otherwise we put the trillion-bacteria dish into an autoclave and kill all of those bacteria. Given that the stained bacterium survives the process, it is far more likely that it was in the trillion-bacteria dish, so it is far more likely that the coin came up heads.
I don't think of the pi digit process as equivalent. Say I interpret 'pi's millionth bit is 0' as heads, and 'pi's millionth bit is 1' as tails. If I repeat the door experiment many times using pi's millionth bit, whoever is behind the red door must die, and whoever's behind the blue doors must survive. And that is going to be the case whether I 'have the math skills and resources to calculate' the bit or not. But it's not going to be the case if I flip fair coins, at least as flipping a fair coin is generally understood in this kind of context.
That would be like repeating the coin version of the experiment many times, using the exact same coin (in the exact same condition), flipping it in the exact same way, in the exact same environment. Even though you don't know all these factors of the initial conditions, or have the computational power to draw conclusions from it, the coin still lands the same way each time.
Since you are willing to suppose that these initial conditions are different in each trial, why not analogously suppose that in each trial of the digit of pi version of the experiment, that you compute a different digit of pi. or, more generally, that in each trial you compute a different logical fact that you were initially completely ignorant about.?
Yes, I think that would work - if I remember right, zeroes and ones are equally likely in pi's binary expansion, so it would successfully mimic flipping a coin with random initial conditions. (ETA: this is interesting. Apparently pi's not yet been shown to have this property. Still, it's plausible.)
This would also work, so long as your bag of facts is equally distributed between true facts and false facts.