Vladimir_Nesov comments on The utility curve of the human population - Less Wrong

5 Post author: dclayh 24 September 2009 09:00PM

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Comment author: wedrifid 25 September 2009 04:05:57PM *  1 point [-]

There certainly is a lot of moral prescription going on. This is mostly indirect, implicit in the kind of questions that get asked rather than directly asserted. "Expected utility" is the right thing to optimise for, almost by definition. But there is more than that at play. In particular, there tends to be an assumption that other people's utility functions will, and in fact 'should' contribute to mine in a simple, sometimes specific, way. I don't particularly respect that presumption.

Edit: Fixed the typo that cousin_it tactfully corrected in his quote.

Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 25 September 2009 06:06:37PM *  2 points [-]

You don't value other people's lives because they value their own lives. Paperclip maximizers value paperclips, but you won't take that into account. It's not so much contribution of other people's utility functions that drives your decisions (or morality). You just want mostly the same things, and care about others' well-being (which you should to an unknown extent, but which you obviously do at least somewhat).

Comment author: wedrifid 25 September 2009 06:16:29PM 0 points [-]

I agree with that summary completely.