randallsquared comments on The Anthropic Trilemma - Less Wrong

24 Post author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 27 September 2009 01:47AM

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Comment author: randallsquared 28 September 2009 12:00:57PM 6 points [-]

As for what happens ten seconds after that, you have no way of knowing how many processors you run on, so you shouldn't feel a thing

Here's the problem, as far as I can see. You shouldn't feel a thing, but that would also be true if none of you ever woke up again. "I won't notice being dead" is not an argument that you won't be dead, so lottery winners should anticipate never waking up again, though they won't experience it (we don't anticipate living forever in the factual world, even though no one ever notices being dead).

I'm sure there's some reason this is considered invalid, since quantum suicide is looked on so favorably around here. :)

Comment author: abramdemski 28 September 2009 08:26:49PM 7 points [-]

The reason is simply that, in the multiple worlds interpretation, we do survive-- we just also die. If we ask "Which of the two will I experience?" then it seems totally valid to argue "I won't experience being dead."

Comment author: randallsquared 01 October 2009 01:08:35PM 1 point [-]

So it basically comes back to pattern-as-identity instead of process-as-identity. Those of me who survive won't experience being dead. I think you can reach my conclusions by summing utility across measure, though, which would make an abrupt decrease in measure equivalent to any other mass death.