I agree, provided "the future myself" is understood as a particular concept describing the structure of the future, and not magical carrier of subjective experience. The terminology of continuation of subjective experience can be decoded through this concept, whenever its instance is found in the environment, but the terminological connection starts to break down when it's not, for example when there are multiple copies. Such cases reveal the problems with subjective experience ontology, its limited applicability.

It's really interesting to read an argument that uses subjective experience terminology, through this lens. For example, take this phrase:

Thus the most probable reconstruction may not be a continuation of the original person's experience. And I think I have a much stronger preference for "seeing the future myself" than "having someone very like me see the future".

This translates thusly: "The most probable reconstruction may not have the property of having the structure of "original person". And I have a much stronger preference for the future containing "future myself" than for the future containing "someone very like me but still significantly different"".