smoofra comments on How to get that Friendly Singularity: a minority view - Less Wrong

12 Post author: Mitchell_Porter 10 October 2009 10:56AM

You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.

Comments (69)

You are viewing a single comment's thread.

Comment author: smoofra 12 October 2009 02:33:18PM 1 point [-]

"The truly fast way to produce a human-relative ideal moral agent is to create an AI with the interim goal of inferring the "human utility function" (but with a few safeguards built in, so it doesn't, e.g., kill off humanity while it solves that sub-problem),"

That is three-laws-of-robotics-ism, and it won't work. There's no such thing as a safe superintelligince that doesn't already share our values.

Comment author: bogdanb 23 September 2010 10:37:43AM *  1 point [-]

Sure­ly there can be such su­per-in­tel­li­gences: Imag­ine a (per­haps autis­tic) IQ-200 guy who just wants to stay in his room and play with his pa­per­clips. He doesn’t re­al­ly care about the rest of the world, he doesn’t care about ex­tend­ing his in­tel­li­gence fur­ther, and the rest of the world doesn’t quite care about his pa­per­clips. Now re­place the guy with an AI with the same val­ues: it’s quite su­per-in­tel­li­gent al­ready, but it’s still safe (in the sense that ob­jec­tive­ly it poses no threat, other than the fact that the re­sources it uses play­ing with its pa­per­clips could be used for some­thing else); I have no prob­lem scal­ing its in­tel­li­gence much fur­ther and leav­ing it just as be­nign.

Of course, once it’s su­per-in­tel­li­gent (quite a bit ear­li­er, in fact), it may be very hard or im­pos­si­ble for us to de­ter­mine that it’s safe — but then again, the same is true for hu­mans, and quite a few of the bil­lions of ex­ist­ing and past hu­mans are or have been very dan­ger­ous.

The dif­fer­ence be­tween “X can’t be safe” and “X can’t be de­ter­mined to be safe” is im­por­tant; the first means “prob­a­bil­i­ty we live, given X, is zero”, and the other means “prob­a­bil­i­ty we live, given X, is strictly less than one”.