jimrandomh comments on How to think like a quantum monadologist - Less Wrong

-14 Post author: Mitchell_Porter 15 October 2009 09:37AM

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Comment author: Mitchell_Porter 19 October 2009 11:58:33AM -2 points [-]

We can skip the details of the story and come straight to the point. Let us suppose that what I see is indeed a two-dimensional data structure in my brain. It has pixels and they are neurally encoded somehow, e.g. by spiking rates.

Now suppose I'm seeing something colored - a blue sky, a red apple, anything. By our hypothesis, what actually exists is nothing but a two-dimensional sheet of neurons all firing in different rhythms - ions moving across membranes, and so forth.

Where is the blueness or the redness, if this and only this is the reality?

It seems to me you have two choices. Either blueness is nothing but ions plunging back and forth across a membrane with a certain regularity; or, there is no such thing as blueness - only talk of blueness, neural dispositions to categorize as blue, and so on.

I think that what people usually imagine is that the ions-crossing-the-membrane-at-a-certain-rate "is" the blueness, but they do this by mentally juxtaposing the physical picture (if they think it through that far) with the blueness that they actually see and experience. But in that case they've gone beyond the nothing-but-the-atoms provision. Or, the troublesome color-word will be buried in a larger phrase, and so all those neural firings are identified with "seeing blue" or "the experience of seeing blue". But I don't see how that solves anything, although psychologically it has the effect of directing your attention away from the blueness itself, towards the more abstract states in which it features. And being more abstract, perhaps it is easier - perhaps it is subjectively more plausible - to imagine that they are nothing but neural computations. However, that's just a trick that you play on yourself.

So I bite the bullet and say, the blueness is obviously there, somewhere in reality; it is obviously not there in a physics which consists of nothing but point masses moving back and forth, or any of the other, slightly more complex physical ontologies on offer; so, I had better seek a perspective on physics in which there is a place where it might be. This is the point of a monadic interpretation of entanglement. I don't say it's the only way to do it, but it is a way to create the necessary room.

Comment author: jimrandomh 19 October 2009 10:48:24PM 3 points [-]

This is an instance of the fallacy described in Explaining vs Explaining Away. Color can be explained by neuroscience and physics, but it can't explain color away because it's still there after you learn what underlies it. You don't have to modify physics to make color real, because it's already real, as an abstraction layered on top of physics.

Comment author: Nick_Tarleton 20 October 2009 04:42:07AM 2 points [-]

Mitchell did acknowledge the existence of the identity view.