Alicorn comments on How to think like a quantum monadologist - Less Wrong

-14 Post author: Mitchell_Porter 15 October 2009 09:37AM

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Comment author: Alicorn 23 October 2009 01:58:06PM *  3 points [-]

Something somewhere is green. So if you propose an account of the world, reductive or otherwise, which purports to be about greenness, something in it had better actually be green.

That doesn't make any sense. Something, somewhere, is a violin. If I propose a reductive account of the violin, none of the component parts I talk about will be a violin. Something, somewhere, is shaped exactly like the building in which I live. A reductive explanation of the building in which I live won't contain any components that are shaped like the building in which I live.

Comment author: Mitchell_Porter 24 October 2009 01:29:45AM -1 points [-]

On consideration of Robin Z's earlier example (temperature), I see that in the usual case of reduction, we have a phenomenon (temperature sensations) with a putative cause ("temperature"), and reduction simply clarifies or changes the nature of the cause. But when we have a reductive "explanation" of consciousness, we are engaging with the phenomenon as such and trying to say what sort of thing it is, not what sort of thing it is caused by. And these proposals for what color is are all missing the mark. It is as if I were to say that a violin is really a sentence in a dictionary.