Incidentally, it may amuse you that others have (independently, for all I can tell) come to entirely similar conclusions:

But nothing requires us to make such an invocation. We don't have to know how we identify or re-identify or gain access to such internal response types in order to be able so to identify them. This is a point that was forcefully made by the pioneer functionalists and materialists, and has never been rebutted (Farrell, 1950, Smart, 1959). The properties of the "thing experienced" are not to be confused with the properties of the event that realizes the experiencing. To put the matter vividly, the physical difference between someone's imagining a purple cow and imagining a green cow might be nothing more than the presence or absence of a particular zero or one in one of the brain's "registers". Such a brute physical presence is all that it would take to anchor the sorts of dispositional differences between imagining a purple cow and imagining a green cow that could then flow, causally, from that "intrinsic" fact. (I doubt that this is what the friends of qualia have had in mind when they have insisted that qualia are intrinsic properties.)

The above comes from Quining Qualia by Daniel Dennett - the citations are to:

• Farrell (1950). "Experience," Mind, 59, pp.170-98.
• Smart, J.C. (1959). "Sensations and Brain Processes," Philosophical Review, LXVIII, pp.141-56.